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Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402
(1989).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,I the United States
Supreme Court held that the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA) drug testing program did not violate the fourth amendment
prohibition against unlawful searches and seizures. 2 The Court held
that drug and alcohol testing of railroad employees constituted a
reasonable search even though the FRA regulations do not require a
warrant, probable cause, or a reasonable suspicion that an employee
is impaired by the use of alcohol or drugs. To reach this conclusion,
the majority balanced government interests in conducting the test-
ing program against employee interests in privacy. This Note
agrees with the dissent's position that the proper analysis of the rea-
sonableness of the drug testing search should proceed according to
the literal requirements of the fourth amendment.
The analysis in this Note will focus on the flaws in the majority
opinion which is founded on a broad, manipulable "balancing of
interests" test. First, this Note discusses the majority's questionable
use of, what this Note terms, the "special needs balancing test."' 3
Next, the Note examines the majority's failure to properly weigh the
privacy side of the balancing test by its blanket acceptance of the
highly intrusive FRA drug testing program. Accordingly, this Note
advocates Justice Marshall's belief that under the majority's subjec-
tive balancing test one can easily achieve whichever outcome one
desires. Finally, this Note demonstrates how the majority's analysis
and holding in Skinner will continue to do damage to the fourth
1 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
2 For the text of the fourth amendment, see infra note 48.
3 See infra notes 172-175 and accompanying text for an explanation of the "special
needs balancing test."
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amendment as it is applied to future extensions of drug testing
programs.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In July, 1983, the FRA began a two-year process to formulate
rules to control the use of alcohol and drugs by on-duty railroad
employees. 4 The Secretary of Transportation of the United States
and, by delegation, the FRA, are authorized to "prescribe, as neces-
sary, appropriate rules, regulations, orders, and standards for all ar-
eas of railroad safety. ' 5 Based on this authorization and on its belief
that alcohol and drug abuse by the nation's railroad employees
poses a serious threat to safety, the FRA promulgated regulations
that require covered employees 6 involved in certain train accidents
to submit to blood and urine tests. The FRA also promulgated reg-
ulations that authorize (but do not require) "railroads to administer
breath and urine tests to employees who violate certain safety
rules." 7
The regulations were, in part, a response to a 1979 study that
found that "[a]n estimated one out of every eight railroad workers
drank at least once while on duty during the study year."8 The
study showed that "23% of operating personnel were 'problem
drinkers'" and that "[o]nly 4% of problem drinkers were receiving
help through an employee assistance program, and even fewer were
handled through disciplinary procedures." 9  The study also re-
vealed that "5% of workers reported to work 'very drunk' or got
'very drunk' on duty at least once in the study year," and "13% of
workers reported to work at least 'a little drunk' one or more times
during [the study year]." 10 Further, the FRA found, based on the
1979 study and other research, that between 1972 and 1983 at least
21 significant train accidents on our nation's railroads involved alco-
4 Brief for the Petitioners at 2, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S.
Ct. 1402 (1989) (No. 87-1555).
5 The Federal Railroad Safety Act, 45 U.S.C. § 431(a) (1982).
6 Covered employees are those employees who are assigned to perform service
under the Hours of Service Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1982), and employees performing
the same services as covered employees. 49 C.F.R. § 219.5(d) (1988). The Hours of
Service Act defines "employee" as "an individual actually engaged in or connected with
the movement of any train, including hostlers." 45 U.S.C. § 61(b)(2) (1982). Webster's
dictionary defines hostler as "2: one who services a vehicle (as a locomotive or truck) or
machine (as a crane)." WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 553 (8th ed. 1977).
7 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1407 (1989).
8 48 Fed. Reg. 30,724 (1983). The study, prepared by the Railroad Employee





hol or drug use as a probable cause or contributing factor. 1 The
FRA observed that these accidents resulted in twenty-five fatalities,
sixty-one non-fatal injuries and approximately nineteen million dol-
lars in property damage (twenty-seven million in 1982 dollars).1 2
Thus, the FRA concluded that alcohol and drug abuse by railroad
employees poses a serious safety threat.' 3
In addition, the FRA found that previous efforts to curb alcohol
and drug abuse by railroad employees had been unsuccessful.' 4
Specifically, the FRA had issued Rule G, an industry wide regulation
which prohibits railroad employees from using or possessing certain
drugs while on duty.' 5 The customary sanction for violation of Rule
G is dismissal.' 6 Due to the problems noted in the 1979 study and
other research, the FRA solicited comments from interested parties
on various regulatory measures designed to curb the problem of al-
cohol and drug abuse throughout the nation's railroad system. 17
The FRA received responses that indicated that Rule G was ineffec-
tive in large part because of the reliance on observations of supervi-
sors and co-workers to report violations and enforce the rule. 18
These reports indicated that railroads were able to detect only a rel-
atively small number of Rule G violations. 19 Thus, after reviewing
further comments from representatives of the railroad industry, la-
bor groups, and the general public, the FRA in 1985 began promul-
gating rules to address the problem of alcohol and drugs on the
railroads. 20
The final regulations apply to covered employees subject to the
Hours of Service Act of 1907.21 The only sections of the regulations
challenged in Skinner as violative of the fourth amendment are Sub-
parts C and D.2 2 Subpart C, entitled "Post-Accident Toxicological
Testing," requires railroads to take steps to acquire blood and urine
I I Id. at 30,726.
12 Id.
13 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1407 (1989).
14 Id.
15 Rule G of the Association of American Railroads Standard Code of Operating
Rules provides: "The use of alcoholic beverages or narcotics by employees subject to
duty is prohibited. Being under the influence of alcoholic beverages or narcotics while
on duty, or their possession while on duty, is prohibited." 49 Fed. Reg. 24,266 (1984).
16 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1407.




21 45 U.S.C. § 61(b)(2) (1982). See supra note 6 for a definition of covered
employees.
22 49 C.F.R. §§ 219.201-.309 (1988). See infra notes 23-25, 32, 34-37 for portions of
the text of Subparts C and D.
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samples of railroad employees directly involved in certain specified
events.23 The events which precipitate testing are 1) a "major train
accident," 24 2) an "impact accident," 25 and 3) "[a]ny train incident
that involves a fatality to any on-duty railroad employee." 26 After
the occurrence of one of the specified events, the railroad must
transport all the crew members and other specified employees to an
independent medical facility where the blood and urine samples will
be taken. 27 An employee may be excepted from testing "if the rail-
road representative can immediately determine, on the basis of spe-
cific information, that the employee had no role in the cause(s) of
the accident/incident." 28 The exception does not apply in the case
of a "major train accident." 29
The employee is asked to complete a form that discloses what
medications the employee has taken during the preceding thirty
days.30 This information is acquired in order to help determine if a
positive test result is due to the employee's lawful use of
23 49 C.F.R. § 219.203(a) (1988) provides:
Employees tested. (1) Following each accident and incident described in § 219.201,
the railroad (or railroads) shall take all practicable steps to assure that all covered
employees of the railroad directly involved in the accident or incident provide blood
and urine samples for toxicological testing by FRA.
(2) Such employees shall specifically include each and every operating em-
ployee assigned as a crew member of any train involved in the accident or incident.
In any case where an operator, dispatcher, signal maintainer or other covered em-
ployee is directly and contemporaneously involved in the circumstances of the acci-
dent/incident, those employees shall also be required to provide samples.
(3) An employee is excluded from testing under the following circumstances:
(i) In any case of an accident/incident for which testing is mandated only under
§ 219.201(a)(2) of this subpart (an "impact accident") or § 219.201(a)(3) ("fatal
train incident"), if the railroad representative can immediately determine, on the
basis of specific information, that the employee had no role in the cause(s) of the
accident/incident. (ii) The following provisions govern accidents/incidents involv-
ing non-covered employees: (A) Surviving non-covered employees are not subject
to testing under this subpart. (B) Testing of the remains of non-covered employees
who are fatally injured in train accidents and incidents is required.
24 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(1) (1988) provides:
Major train accident. Any train accident that involves one or more of the following:
(i) A fatality; (ii) Release of a hazardous material accompanied by-(A) An evacua-
tion; or (B) A reportable injury resulting from the hazardous material release (e.g.,
from fire, explosion, inhalation, or skin contact with the material); or (iii) Damage to
railroad property of $500,000 or more.
25 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(2) (1988) provides: "Impact Accident. An impact accident
resulting in-(i)A reportable injury; or (ii) Damage to railroad property of $50,000 or
more."
26 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(1) (1988).
27 49 C.F.R. § 219.203(c) (1988).
28 49 C.F.R. § 219.203(a)(3)(i) (1988); see supra note 23.
29 Id.
30 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1418 n.7 (1989); 49




If an employee refuses to provide the blood or urine samples,
the employee is dismissed from covered service for nine months. 32
The employee is entitled to a hearing concerning his or her refusal
to take the test.33 The FRA must notify employees of their test re-
sults and allow the employees to respond in writing before the prep-
aration of any final investigative report.3 4 Finally, the regulations in
Subpart C provide that the FRA may release positive test results to
prosecutors .35
Subpart D, entitled "Authorization to Test for Cause," autho-
rizes railroads to require employees to submit to breath and urine
toxicological testing under the following specified circumstances:3 6
31 Id.
32 49 C.F.R. § 219.213(a) (1988) provides:
Disqualification. (1) An employee who refuses to cooperate in providing a blood or
urine sample following an accident or incident specified in this section shall be with-
drawn from covered service and shall be deemed disqualified for covered service for
a period of nine (9) months. (2) The disqualification required by this paragraph
shall apply with respect to employment in covered serice by any railroad with notice
of such disqualification. (3) The requirement of disqualification for nine (9) months
does not limit any discretion on the part of the railroad to impose additional sanc-
tions for the same or related conduct.
33 49 C.F.R. § 219.213(b) (1988).
34 49 C.F.R. § 219.211(a)(2) (1988) provides:
FRA notifies the railroad and the tested employee of the results of the toxicological
analysis and permits the employee to respond in writing to the results of the test
prior to preparing any final investigation report concerning the accident or inci-
dent. Results of the toxicological analysis and any response from the employee are
also promptly made available to the National Transportation Safety Board on
request.
35 49 C.F.R. § 219.211(d) (1988) provides:
Each sample provided under this subpart is retained for not less than six months
following the date of the accident or incident and may be made available to the
National Transportation Safety Board (on request) or to a party in litigation upon
service of appropriate compulsory process on the custodian of the sample at least
ten (10) days prior to the return date of such process. It is the policy of FRA to
request the Attorney General to oppose production of the sample to a party in liti-
gation unless a copy of the subpoena, order, or other process is contemporaneously
served on the Chief Counsel, FRA, Washington, D.C.
36 The regulations also provide that breath tests may be required when a supervisor
has a "reasonable suspicion" that an employee is intoxicated and urine tests may be
required when two supervisors have determined that an employee is under the influence
of or impaired by alcohol or drugs. 49 C.F.R. §§ 219.301(b)(1), (c)(2) (1988). When
requiring a urine test, however, one of the supervisors making the determination to test
must have received specialized training in detecting the signs of drug intoxication. The
training involves a three-hour course in signs of drug intoxication. 49 C.F.R.
§ 219.301(c)(2)(ii) (1988).
The Court did not address the issue of whether these sections of Subpart D violated
the fourth amendment because they are based on a finding of individualized suspicion
before testing. The Respondent's brief did take issue with these sections because they
felt these other sections serve as a further example of the excessive aspects in the FRA's
program and because they felt that the "training" of the supervisors was inadequate.
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1) a reportable accident or incident occurs and the supervisor has
"reasonable suspicion" that the employee is involved in the event;
and 2) the employee is involved in specific rule violations, including
non-compliance with a signal and excessive speeding.3 7 The regula-
tions under Subpart D require the railroad to provide detailed no-
tice to the employees that the railroad will consider any positive
breath and/or urine test results as a sign of impairment; thus, the
employee has the right to submit a blood sample, at the same time
he or she is required to produce the breath and/or urine sample, in
order to rebut the presumption of current impairment.38 Similar to
Subpart C, Subpart D specifies procedures for the collection and
analysis of samples.39
The respondents, Railway Labor Executives' Association
(RLEA), brought this action in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California to enjoin the FRA from enforcing
Brief for the Respondents at 34, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct.
1402 (1989) (No. 87-1555).
37 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(b) provides:
Reasonable cause for breath tests. The following circumstances constitute reasonable
cause for the administration of breath tests under this section: (1) Reasonable suspi-
don. [See supra note 36 for discussion of toxicological testing based on a reasonable
suspicion that the employee is under the influence.] (2) Accident/incident. The em-
ployee has been involved in an accident or incident reportable under Part 225 of
this title, and a supervisory employee of the railroad has a reasonable suspicion that
the employee's acts or omissions contributed to the occurrence or severity of the
accident or incident; or (3) Rule violation. The employee has been directly involved
in one of the following operating rule violations or errors: (i) Noncompliance with
a train order, track warrant, timetable, signal indication, special instruction or other
direction with respect to movement of a train that involves-(A) Occupancy of a
block or other segment of track to which entry was not authorized; (B) Failure to
clear a track to permit opposing or following movement to pass; (C) Moving across
a railroad crossing at grade without authorization; or (D) Passing an absolute re-
strictive signal or passing a restrictive sign without stopping (if required); (ii) Fail-
ure to protect a train as required by a rule consist [sic] with § 218.37 of this title;
(iii) Operation of a train at a speed that exceeds the maximum authorized speed by
at least ten (10) miles per hour or by fifty percent (50%) of such maximum author-
ized speed, whichever is less; (iv) Alignment of a switch in violation of a railroad
rule or operation of a switch under a train; (v) Failure to apply or stop short of
derail as required; (vi) Failure to secure a hand brake or failure to secure sufficient
hand brakes; or (vii) In the case of a person performing a dispatching function or
block operator function, issuance of a train order or establishment of a route that
fails to provide proper protection for a train.
49 C.F.R. § 219.301(c) (1988) provides:
Reasonable cause for urine tests. (1) Accident/incident and rule violation. Except as pro-
vided in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, each of the conditions set forth in
paragraphs (b)(2) ("accident/incident") and (b)(3) ("rule violation") of this section
as constituting reasonable cause for breath testing also constitutes reasonable cause
with respect to urine testing. (2) Reasonable suspicion. [See supra note 36 for discus-
sion of toxicological testing based on a reasonable suspicion that the employee is
under the influence.]
38 49 C.F.R. § 219.309 (1988).
39 49 C.F.R. § 219.307 (1988).
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the above described regulations.40 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment to the petitioner, the Secretary of Transportation of
the United States, under whose authority the regulations were
promulgated. 4 1 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed the district court, finding, inter alia, that a search under the
fourth amendment is not reasonable unless there is a finding of
"particularized suspicion." 42 The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari4 3 to consider whether the regulations violate the fourth amend-
ment and set the oral argument date to coincide with arguments for
the companion case of National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von
Raab.44
III. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
In Skinner, the Court held that regulations which mandate or
authorize drug and alcohol tests of railroad employees are reason-
able under the fourth amendment even though there is no require-
ment of a warrant, probable cause or a reasonable suspicion that any
particular employee is under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 45
Writing for the majority, 4 6 Justice Kennedy reasoned that the alco-
hol and drug testing of covered employees after certain triggering
incidents was reasonable: 1) the regulations gave the railroad em-
ployers limited discretion when applying the regulations; 2) the gov-
ernment has a compelling interest in the safety of the nation's
railroads; and 3) railroad employees have a diminished expectation
of privacy over information about their fitness on the job.47
1. Drug Testing is a Search to Which the Fourth Amendment Applies
Justice Kennedy first addressed the question of whether the
fourth amendment is applicable to the testing of railroad employees
by private railroads and, if the amendment is applicable, whether
the alcohol and drug testing constitutes a search. 48 First, the Court
40 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
41 Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Dole, No. C85-7958-CAL, (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9,
1985).
42 Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988).
43 Burnley v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988).
44 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989) (drug testing of Customs Service employees).
45 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
46 Justice Kennedy was joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices White, Black-
mun, O'Connor, and Scalia.
47 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1422.
48 The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
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ascertained that the amendment applies to searches or seizures
taken by a private party who is acting as an instrument or agent of
the government. 49 The Court found that, clearly, Subpart C of the
regulations, which requires private railroads to test employees after
certain train accidents and incidents, was attributable to the govern-
ment'and thus implicated the fourth amendment.50 Likewise, the
Court determined that the fourth amendment was applicable to the
testing authorized by Subpart D because of the "[g]overnment's en-
couragement, endorsement and participation" in adopting the
regulations. 5 1
Next, the majority held that the collection and analysis of the
blood, urine, and breath samples constituted a search under the
fourth amendment.52 Justice Kennedy cited a long line of cases that
have held that each of the above tests of an employee's body fluids
constitutes a search.53 The majority declined to consider whether
the tests constitute a seizure, except to the extent that any limit on
an employee's freedom of movement in order to procure the blood,
urine or breath samples, bears on the assessment of the intrusive-
ness of the searches under the FRA's regulations. 54 Hence, Justice
Kennedy turned to the critical question of whether the searches pre-
scribed by the FRA regulations are reasonable under the fourth
amendment.
2. A Reasonable Search Does Not Depend Upon a Warrant or Probable
Cause When a "Special Need" Exists
The majority observed that, except in certain well-defined cir-
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be iolated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
49 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1411.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 1412.
52 Id. at 1413.
53 Id. at 1412-13 (citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 481 (1984) (breath);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966) (blood); Lovvorn v. City of Chat-
tanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1542 (6th Cir.) (arine), vacated and rehk'g granted, 861 F.2d 1388
(6th Cir. 1988); Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dept., 840 F.2d 1139, 1143 (3d Cir.
1988) (urine), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1636-37 (1989); Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n. v.
Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 580 (9th Cir. 1988) (case below); Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d
1507, 1511 (11th Cir. 1987) (urine); Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 338 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (urine), vacated and remanded, 109 S. Ct. 1633 (1989); National Treasury Employ-
ees' Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 1987) (urine), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part and remanded, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989); McDonnell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1307
(8th Cir. 1987) (urine); Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d
1264, 1266-67 (7th Cir.) (urine), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976)).
54 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1413.
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cumstances, a search is not reasonable unless it is made pursuant to
a warrant issued upon probable cause. 55 The Court noted that one
exception to the warrant and probable cause requirement of the
fourth amendment arises when there exists "special needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement." 56 The majority held that the
government's interest in "regulating the conduct of railroad em-
ployees to ensure safety" is a "special need" beyond normal law
enforcement. 57
The majority found that the "governmental interest in ensuring
the safety of the traveling public and of the employees themselves
plainly justifies prohibiting covered employees from using alcohol
or drugs on duty, or while subject to being called for duty." s58 Thus,
Justice Kennedy wrote that the remaining question for the Court to
consider was whether the government's need to monitor compliance
with the regulations justifies the intrusion into the employees' pri-
vacy absent a warrant or individualized suspicion. 59
a. The Warrant Requirement Is Not Necessary to Make the Drug
Testing Search Reasonable
The majority examined the reasons for having the warrant re-
quirement in the fourth amendment and concluded that these rea-
sons would not be advanced by requiring a warrant in the case of
alcohol and drug testing of railroad employees. 60 The Court stated
that "[a]n essential purpose of a warrant requirement is to protect
privacy interests by assuring citizens subject to a search or seizure
that such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary acts of govern-
ment agents." 6' Justice Kennedy noted that a warrant allows for the
objective determination by a neutral magistrate as to whether or not
the search is justified.62 The Court felt that the circumstances justi-
55 Id. at 1414 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); Mincey v. Ari-
zona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)).
56 Id. at 1414 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)).
57 Id. at 1414. The majority analogized the "special need" to search in Skinner to the
"special need" found in the following cases: Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74
(1987) (a search of probationer's home); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-703
(1987) (search of premises of certain highly regulated businesses); O'Connor v. Ortega,
480 U.S. 709, 721-25 (1987) (work-related search of employees' desks and offices); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-42 (1985) (search of student property by school
officials); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979) (visual body cavity searches of
prison inmates).
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fying the testing of employees under the FRA regulations and the
scope of the tests are narrowly defined and well known to the cov-
ered employees. 63 Thus, Justice Kennedy stated, given "the stan-
dardized nature of the tests and the minimal discretion vested in
those charged with administering the program, there are virtually
no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate." 64 In addition, Justice
Kennedy observed that the requirement of a warrant may hinder the
objectives of the regulations as valuable evidence may be destroyed
while procuring a warrant.65 Lastly, the majority felt that it would
be unfair to impose the burdensome warrant procedure require-
ments on the railroad supervisors. 66 Justice Kennedy concluded the
Court's consideration of a warrant requirement by writing, "In sum,
imposing a warrant requirement in the present context would add
little to the assurances of certainty and regularity already afforded
by the regulations, while significantly hindering, and in many cases
frustrating, the objectives of the Government's testing program."67
b. Drug Testing Is a Limited Intrusion on an Employee's Privacy
The majority held that neither probable cause nor even the
presence of individualized suspicion that a search will turn up evi-
dence is a requirement when determining that a search is reasonable
under the fourth amendment. 68 Using a balancing of interests test,
Justice Kennedy wrote that "[i]n limited circumstances, where the
privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an
important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would
be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion,
a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such
suspicion." 69
The Court found that the FRA regulations are a limited intru-
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1415-16.
65 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1416. The Court noted that "alcohol and other drugs are
eliminated from the bloodstream at a constant rate." Id. Thus, in order to facilitate the
judgment of whether the railroad employees were impaired at the time of the acci-
dent/incident in question, the employees should be tested as soon as possible following
the "triggering event." Id.
66 Id. at 1416.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1417. The majority noted that its precedent indicates that when a search
may be performed without a warrant, a showing of probable cause to believe that the
person to be searched has violated the law is still required. Id. Furthermore, the major-
ity noted that when a balancing of interests indicates that a showing of probable cause is





sion on the employees' privacy. First, Justice Kennedy observed
that the transportation of employees to the medical facilities was
reasonable as employees ordinarily consent to restrictions in their
freedom of movement on thejob. 70 To illustrate, he noted that em-
ployees are not allowed to come and go as they please during work-
ing hours.71 Similarly, the Court observed that the time spent
obtaining a sample is not a significant infringement on an em-
ployee's privacy expectations. 72 Next, the Court considered, in
turn, the processes of obtaining a blood sample, a breath sample,
and a urine sample in order to determine if the procedures were an
intrusion on the employee's privacy. 73
Citing Schmerber v. California,74 the majority found that society
does not consider blood tests an infringement on significant privacy
interests. 75 Instead, Justice Kennedy read Schmerber as confirming
Court precedent that indicates that the taking of blood is a routine,
safe, and painless procedure that does not "constitute an unduly ex-
tensive imposition on an individual's privacy and bodily integrity. 76
The majority found that breath tests are even less instrusive
than blood tests and, therefore, breath tests are not a significant in-
trusion on an individual's privacy. 77 Justice Kennedy distinguished
breath tests from blood tests by pointing out that breath tests do not
require the skin to be pierced nor do such tests require a hospital
environment. 78 Further, he stated, whereas blood tests will be used
to detect alcohol and other drugs, breath tests are only used to de-
tect alcohol. 79
Finally, Justice Kennedy addressed the process of collecting a
urine sample and again concluded that this process does not in-
fringe on significant privacy interests. Justice Kennedy noted that,
like the breath test, a urine test does not require the piercing of
skin. 80 Further, Justice Kennedy continued, like the blood and




73 Id. at 1417-18.
74 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (state may have a physician in a hospital environment take a
blood sample from a motorist suspected of driving under the influence even though the
motorist does not consent).
75 Id. at 1417.
76 Id. (citing Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1983); South Dakota v. Neville, 459
U.S. 553, 563 (1983); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957)).
77 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1417.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1417-18.
80 Id. at 1418.
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into private facts unrelated to alcohol and drug use.8' The Court
did recognize that the act of urination in our society is "traditionally
shielded by great privacy." 8 2 However, the Court noted that the
regulations are designed to minimize the intrusion by not requiring
direct observation of the production of the urine sample.83 Justice
Kennedy also noted that the required urine test is similar to that
required during a regular physical examination as medical person-
nel (and not railroad personnel) will collect the samples.8 4
Having considered the privacy concerns implicated in the col-
lection of the biological samples, the majority turned to the argu-
ment that the regulations are a minimal intrusion on an employee's
privacy because of the employee's participation in an industry highly
regulated to ensure safety. The Court emphasized that the railroad
industry has long been governed by several regulations which are
directed toward safety concerns.8 5 Thus, the Court felt that "logic
and history show that a diminished expectation of privacy attaches
to information relating to the physical condition of covered employ-
ees."8 6 Therefore, the majority concluded that the testing proce-
dures under Subparts C and D pose only limited threats to an
employee's justifiable expectation of privacy.8 7
c. The Government's Interest in Drug Testing Employees Is
Compelling
The majority considered the other side of the balancing test
and concluded that the government presented a compelling interest
to justify testing employees without a showing of individualized sus-
81 Id. at 1418 n.7. The majority explained that the private medical information that
the employee must disclose when submitting to toxicological testing is not a significant
invasion of privacy because "there is no indication that the Government does not treat
this information as confidential, or that it uses the information for any other purpose."
Id. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text for reasoning behind requiring em-
ployees to fill out form disclosing private medical information.
82 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1418.
83 Id. However, Justice Kennedy noted that direct observation would be desirable in
order to assure the integrity of the samples. Id.
84 Id. at 1418.
85 The majority cited the following: The Hours of Service Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 61-66
(1982) (limiting the amount of hours a covered employee may work); The Federal Rail-
road Safety Act, 45 U.S.C. § 437(a) (1982) (authorizing the Secretary of Transportation
to test "railroad facilities, equipment, rolling stock, operations, or persons, as he deems
necessary" in order to fulfill the mandate to provide for safety on the railroads); state
laws that require physical examinations of certain railroad employees; and Rule G, 49
Fed. Reg. 24,266 (1984) (industry wide acceptance and enforcement of prohibition
against use of alcohol or drugs by on-duty employees). Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1418 & n.8.




picion.88 Justice Kennedy expressed the majority's concern that im-
paired employees in the railroad industry, like those in the nuclear
power plant industry, can be the cause of disastrous accidents.8 9
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy postulated that many human lives
could be lost before a supervisor has detected any signs of impair-
ment in an employee.9 0 The majority noted that, although the regu-
lations do not describe a perfect and easy means of detecting
impaired employees, the tests do serve the purpose of deterring em-
ployees from using alcohol or drugs in the first place. 9 1 According
to Justice Kennedy, employees will be deterred because they know
that they will be tested upon the unpredictable occurrence of certain
events.
9 2
The majority declined to consider any alternative methods to
address the problem of alcohol and drugs in the railroad industry.
Justice Kennedy pointed to the failure of Rule G to stop the use of
alcohol and drugs by railroad employees. 93 The majority found that
the FRA regulations were "reasonable" and, thus, did not wish to
second-guess the solution provided by the FRA after many years of
research and study. 94
The majority noted that the government's interest in testing is
strong because testing will provide valuable information as to the
causes of an accident or safety violation. 95 Justice Kennedy found
that a positive test result would establish that an accident was either
caused by an impaired employee or perhaps made worse by an im-
paired employee's inability to respond to the accident promptly.96
The Court also found that negative test results will provide valuable
information, because then authorities may focus on the significance
of other factors such as equipment failure or inadequate training of
employees. 9 7 In order to achieve this important government aim of
determining cause, the majority found that it would be impractica-
ble to require a showing of individualized suspicion. 98 The Court
noted that, at the chaotic scene of an accident, it would be very diffi-
88 Id.
89 Id. (citing Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir.
1988); Alverado Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 111 Wash. 2d 424, 436, 759 P.2d
427, 433-34 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989)).
90 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1419.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 1420.
93 Id. at 1419-20.
94 Id. at 1419 n.9.
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cult (if not impossible) to objectively determine if any particular em-
ployee is impaired by alcohol or drugs. 9 9
Also, the majority found that after a safety violation under Sub-
part D of the FRA regulations, an objective determination of em-
ployee impairment would be difficult. The difficulty in determining
whether or not there is enough individualized suspicion to test an
employee, the majority continued, may result in a loss of valuable
evidence. 0 Thus, the majority concluded that "[i]t would be un-
realistic, and inimical to the Government's goal of ensuring safety in
rail transportation, to require a showing of individualized suspicion
in these circumstances." 10 1
The majority criticized the appellate court's opinion that the
regulations constitute an unreasonable search because the blood
and urine tests cannot measure an employee's current degree of
drug impairment.' 0 2 With the requirement of both blood and urine
tests, Justice Kennedy argued that the regulations are an effective
means of determining on-duty impairment as well as deterring drug
use.10 3 Justice Kennedy explained that, even if the tests only show
evidence of aTecent use of-drugs (and-not the specific time when the
drugs were ingested), then this evidence is useful because it pro-
vides the basis for further investigation as to "whether the employee
used drugs at the relevant times."' 1 4 Further, the majority noted
that the FRA regulations place principal reliance on the blood tests
which can detect recent drug use.10 5
3. Summary of Majority Opinion
Thus, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision that
the regulations are an unreasonable search under the fourth amend-
ment. The majority concluded that the government's compelling
interests outweigh the employee's privacy concerns because the reg-
ulations give the railroad supervisors administering the tests limited
discretion, the employees have diminished privacy expectations re-
garding their fitness, and the government has surpassing safety in-
terests.' 0 6 Justice Kennedy emphasized the evils of drug and




102 Id. The appellate court's decision is reported in Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n
v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 1988).
103 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1421.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 1422.
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lives of others. 10 7 Because the nature of the evil lies hidden in bod-
ily fluids, the majority held that blood, breath, and urine tests of
railroad employees, without a warrant or reasonable suspicion that
any particular employee is impaired, is a reasonable search under
the fourth amendment.' 0 8
B. CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment of the Court, but dis-
agreed with the majority's position that deterring employees from
using alcohol or drugs would be a product of the regulations. Jus-
tice Stevens contended that the argument of deterring employees
from drug use was neither necessary nor sufficient to justify the reg-
ulations. He stated, "[I]f the risk of serious personal injury does not
deter [employees'] use of these substances, it seems highly unlikely
that the additional threat of loss of employment would have any ef-
fect on their behavior."' 0 9
C. DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Marshall" 0 dissented from the majority's opinion on the
ground that the majority manipulated its legal reasoning in order to
respond to the public policy of declaring war on drugs." I Accord-
ing to the dissent, just as past cases of "urgency" have resulted in
decisions that pose a threat to the liberties of United States citizens,
so this case sacrifices constitutional freedoms. 112 More specifically,
Justice Marshall argued that the majority erred in using a "special
107 Id. at 1421.
108 Id. at 1421-22.
109 Id. at 1422 (Stevens, J., concurring).
10 Justice Brennan joined justice Marshall's dissent.
I11 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1422 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
112 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17
(1951) (holding as constitutional a statute which forbade advocating the overthrow of
the United States Government by force or violence because the "conspiracy to organize
the Communist Party and to teach and advocate the overthrow of the Government of the
United States by force and violence created a 'clear and present danger' "); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217 (1944) (holding as constitutional that a Civil Exclu-
sion Order directing the exclusion from a described West Coast military area of all per-
sons ofJapanese ancestry because "the successful prosecution of the war requires every
possible protection against espionage and against sabotage."); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 95 (1943) (holding an Executive Order requiring persons ofJapa-
nese ancestry to observe a curfew constitutional because the curfew was applied as "a
protective measure necessary to meet the threat of sabotage and espionage"); Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 48 (1919) (affirming a conviction of defendants for distrib-
uting a leaflet encouraging men to oppose the draft as not violative of the Constitution
because the leaflet was used in such a circumstance-the United States was at war with
the German Empire-as to "create a clear and present danger that they [the leaflets] will
bring about substantive evils which Congress has a right to prevent")).
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needs" balancing of interests test. Justice Marshall explained that,
based on the text and doctrinal history of the fourth amendment,
the majority's comparison of the employees' privacy interests versus
the government's interest in safety was inappropriate.' 13 The dis-
sent reasoned further that even if the balancing test were appropri-
ate, the majority erred in its application of the test by "trivializing
the raw intrusiveness of, and overlooking serious conceptual and
operational flaws in, the FRA's testing program."114
1. The Majority's Dismissal of the Probable Cause
Requirement Ignored Precedent
Justice Marshall argued that the probable cause requirement in
the fourth amendment should not be dismissed as "impracticable"
by the majority's finding of a "special need" beyond the normal
need for law enforcement. 1 5 The dissent referred to an unbroken
line of cases that upheld the probable cause requirement for a full-
scale search whether or not the search was conducted with a warrant
or as one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant require-
ment. 116 Furthermore, Justice 'Marshall noted that the probable
cause requirement has only been relaxed in those cases where the
government action was not a full-scale search, and even in those
cases individualized suspicion was still required.'17 In the few cases
where individualized suspicion was not required, explained Justice
Marshall, the searches involved "routinized, fleeting, and nonintru-
sive encounters conducted pursuant to regulatory programs which
entailed no contact with the person."' "18
Justice Marshall noted that the Court has only recently devised
the "special needs" test which makes the requirement of probable
cause "impracticable" when their exists a "'special need' beyond
the normal need for law enforcement." ' 1 9 The dissent noted that,
113 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1423 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
114 Id. (Marshall, J, dissenting).
115 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 1424 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325
358-59, n.3 (1985); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970), reh'g denied, 400 U.S.
856 (1970)).
117 Id. at 1424 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 1424 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543 (1976) (brief interrogative stop at permanent border checkpoint to ascertain
motorist's residence status); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (routine
annual inspection by city housing department)).
19 109 S. Ct. at 1423 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The cases prior to Skinner where the
Court has used the special needs test include the following: Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868 (1987) (search of a probationer's home without a warrant or probable cause
was reasonable); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (search of a government
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"tellingly," whenever the Court has used the "special needs" test
instead of the literal requirements of the fourth amendment, the
Court has deemed the contested search reasonable under the fourth
amendment. 120 Justice Marshall has dissented in all of these "spe-
cial needs" cases, as they have resulted in doing away with a stan-
dard found in the text of the fourth amendment (probable cause)
for one that is easily manipulable by the Court. 121 The dissent at-
tacked the majority's reliance on New Jersey v. T.L.O., 12 2 O'Connor v.
Ortega,12 3 and Griffin v. Wisconsin 124 as calling for the extension of the
"special needs" test to the case at hand, because those cases all in-
volved some degree of individualized suspicion. 125 Justice Marshall
asserted that the Skinner majority has eviscerated the probable cause
requirement of the fourth amendment by authorizing "searches of
the human body unsupported by any evidence of wrongdoing."'' 2 6
Justice Marshall warned that the majority's holding endangers " 'the
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.' "127
2. The Dissent's Fourth Amendment Analysis
Justice Marshall believed the proper analysis-and the tradi-
tional method until the recent "special needs" cases--of whether
the regulations violate the fourth amendment should consider the
following four-pronged criteria. First, the Court should determine
employee's office without a warrant or probable cause was reasonable); and New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (search of a student's purse without a warrant or prob-
able cause was reasonable).
120 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1424-25 & n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall
quoted Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 878 (1987) ("special needs" equal "the need
to preserve 'the deterrent effect of the supervisory arrangement' of probation");
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) ("special needs" equal "'the efficient
and proper operation of the workplace' "); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341
(1985) ("special needs" equal " 'the substantial need of teachers and administrators for
freedom to maintain order in the schools' ").
121 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1425 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
122 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
123 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
124 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
125 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1425 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 346
(teacher's report that student had been smoking provided reasonable suspicion that
purse contained cigarettes); O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 726 (charges of specific financial im-
proprieties gave employer individualized suspicion of misconduct by employee); Griffin,
483 U.S. at 879-80 (tip to police officer that probationer was storing guns in his apart-
ment provided reasonable suspicion)).
126 Id. at 1425 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 1426 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled on other grounds, Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967)).
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whether a search has taken place. Second, the Court should deter-
mine whether the search was based on a valid warrant or undertaken
pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.
Third, the Court should ask whether the search was based on prob-
able cause or on a lesser suspicion because the search was minimally
intrusive. Fourth, the Court should determine whether the search
was conducted in a reasonable manner.1 28 If the Court finds that all
four criteria are answered in the positive, only then may the Court
deem the search reasonable under the fourth amendment.
As to the first prong of the criteria, the dissent agreed with the
majority's position that the FRA testing program entails a search of
the covered employees. 129 However, any agreement between the
two opinions ended there as Justice Marshall applied the remaining
prongs of his fourth amendment analysis. Justice Marshall found
that as to the second prong-the warrant requirement-the "exi-
gent circumstances" exception may apply to the present case due to
destruction of evidence while a warrant is being obtained.130 None-
theless, stated Justice Marshall, the railroads should be required to
obtain a warrant before the blood and urine samples are tested as the
samples can be properly preserved to prevent the destruction of
evidence. 13 1
Justice Marshall found that the FRA regulations also failed to
comply with the third prong requiring a showing of probable cause.
This failure, Justice Marshall reasoned, accounts for the majority's
resort to the "special needs" test.'3 2 The dissent explained that the
FRA's highly intrusive collection and testing procedures constitute a
full-scale personal search which requires a showing of probable
cause. 133 Justice Marshall adamantly argued throughout his opinion
that the FRA testing procedures are extremely intrusive. 134
Just as the majority relied on Schmerber 135 to explain that col-
lecting a blood sample is-a minimal intrusion on an employee's pri-
vacy, Justice Marshall also relied on Schmerber to show that such
intrusion is not justified without a finding of individualized suspi-
cion. Quoting from that case, Justice Marshall wrote:
"The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amend-
ment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that de-
128 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1426 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
129 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
130 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
13' Id. (Marshall, J, dissenting).
132 Id. at 1427 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'33 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'34 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
135 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 757 (see supra note 74 for majority's use of Schmerber).
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sired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication
that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human in-
terests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may
disappear."' 3 6
Justice Marshall found that the urine tests under the FRA regu-
lations were an even greater intrusion into an individual's expecta-
tion of privacy. Justice Marshall stated that "[u]rination is among
the most private of activities. It is generally forbidden in public, es-
chewed as a matter of conversation, and performed in places
designed to preserve this tradition of personal seclusion."' 37 The
dissent pointed out that although the regulations do not "require"
direct observation, they do emphasize that "observation is the most
effective means" of ensuring the integrity of the sample. ' 38 Further-
more, continued Justice Marshall, the FRA Field Manual instructs
supervisors that the covered employees must provide urine samples
"under direct observation by the physician/technician."' 3 9 Justice
Marshall stated that it was naive for the majority to suggest that "of-
ficials monitoring urination will disregard the clear commands of
the Field Manual."' 140
As a final argument that the urine tests are intrusive, the dissent
examined the majority's own words when they were determining
that the urine test is a search. 141 Justice Marshall criticized the ma-
jority for describing the sacredness of passing urine in order to rule
that there had been a search under the fourth amendment without
considering these same reasons when determining whether the
search intrudes on an individual's privacy expectations.142 This dis-
continuity, reasoned Justice Marshall, reemphasizes the "shameless
manipulability of [the majority's] balancing approach."' 143
The dissent continued its analysis of the third prong question
of whether or not the search was minimally intrusive by finding that
the testing of the samples itself implicates strong privacy concerns.
Justice Marshall explained that technology enables the state to dis-
cover not only what drugs the employee has been consuming but
also whether an employee is pregnant, has epilepsy, clinical depres-
136 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1427 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at
769-70.).
137 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1428 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
138 Id. at 1428 & n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
139 Id. at 1428 n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRA-
TION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, FIELD MANUAL: CONTROL OF AL-
COHOL AND DRUG USE IN RAILROAD OPERATIONS D-5 (1986) [hereinafter FIELD MANUAL]).
140 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1428 n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 1429 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
143 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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sion, and a number of other medical disorders.1 44 Also, noted the
dissent, the regulations require an employee to disclose what medi-
cations he or she has taken within the preceding thirty days.1 45 Jus-
tice Marshall reasoned that both these factors add up to a large
encroachment on the privacy of personal health secrets.' 46
Next, the dissent rejected Justice Kennedy's assertion that an
employee has relinquished his or her privacy concerns by participat-
ing in the railroad industry. 147 Justice Marshall observed that the
Court's regulated industry decisions have never allowed (until this
case) for the searches of persons without a showing of probable
cause. 148 For emphasis, Justice Marshall cited the Court's position
in O'Connor that "individuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights
at the workplace gate." 149
-In addition, the dissent argued with Justice Kennedy's sugges-
tion that workers concede their right to privacy in their bodies by
undergoing periodic physical examinations.150 Justice Marshall rea-
soned that the fact that railroad workers must sometimes undergo
tests of eyesight, hearing, skill, intelligence, and agility does not in-
dicate their consent to undergo the extraction of their blood, the
supervision of their excretion, or the testing of these bodily fluids
for the "physiological and psychological secrets they may con-
tain." 5' Justice Marshall likened this presumption to a finding that
employees who release basic information about their financial and
personal history in order for an employer to make a determination
about their "ethical fitness" also consent to allowing the govern-
ment to examine their personal letters, diaries, and bankbooks. 52
Justice Marshall concluded that, due to the intrusiveness of the
FRA regulations, the drug testing program amounts to a full-scale
search justified only by a showing of probable cause. Thus, the
144 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
145 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
146 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
147 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
148 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Instead, the regulated industry cases have only per-
mitted searches of an employer's property. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700
(1987); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978).
149 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1430 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing O'Connor v. Ortega,
480 U.S. 709, 716-18 (1987) ("Individuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely
because they work for the government instead of a private employer.").
150 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1430 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
151 Id. (Marshall,J., dissenting). Justice Marshall confined his discussion to the collec-
tion and testing of blood and urine samples although he noted that breath tests are also
subject to constitutional safeguards. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1426 n.6 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
152 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1430 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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third prong of the fourth amendment criteria was not satisfied. 153
Justice Marshall acknowledged that imposing the fourth amend-
ment's probable cause requirement on the FRA regulations may
hinder the government's laudable purpose of trying to make rail
transit as safe as humanly possible. 154 However, Justice Marshall
defended his position by noting that "constitutional rights have
their consequences, and one is that efforts to maximize the public
welfare, no matter how well-intentioned, must always be pursued
within constitutional boundaries."' 155
3. The Employee's Privacy Concerns Outweigh the
Government's Interest in Drug Testing
Even though Justice Marshall believed the FRA regulations are
unconstitutional without a showing of probable cause, he temporar-
ily adopted the majority's "multifactor balancing test" to show that
even under this test he still finds the FRA drug testing program un-
constitutional. 156 As Justice Marshall had explained previously in
his opinion, the suspicionless testing of railroad employees consti-
tutes an intrusion on privacy that is far from minimal. 157 Further, he
argued, the cost of this invasion on personal liberty is not out-
weighed by any benefit of such testing. 158
Justice Marshall found that "several aspects of the FRA's testing
program exacerbate the intrusiveness of these procedures."' 159 Ac-
cording to the dissent, the primary indication of the excessiveness of
the drug testing program was the fact that the regulations do not
prohibit, and actually provide for, turning over test results to prose-
cutors. 160 Additionally, as the dissent notes, the FRA testing pro-
gram is needlessly intrusive by requiring the mandatory collection
of urine samples when, as the agency has conceded, urine tests, un-
153 Id. at 1429 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall did not specifically address
the fourth prong question of whether the search was conducted in a reasonable manner.
Given his third prong analysis and conclusion that the drug testing program is highly
intrusive, it is very likely that Justice Marshall would conclude that the FRA regulations
also fail the fourth prong of his analysis.
154 Id. at 1430 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
155 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
156 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
157 Id. at 1431 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see supra note 134 and accompanying text.
158 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1431 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
159 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
160 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority held that the possibility of criminal
prosecution does not factor into the balancing test unless it is shown that the searches
which turned up the evidence were simply a "pretext" for obtaining the evidence. Skin-
net, 109 S. Ct. at 1415 n.5. But see National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab,
109 S. Ct. 1384, 1390 (1989) (Customs Service drug-testing program prohibits use of
test results in criminal prosecutions).
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like blood tests, do not measure current impairment.1 6' Thus, Jus-
tice Marshall asserted that the majority trivialized the impact the
regulations would have on a worker's privacy while at the same time
it endorsed the government's claim that the regulations will help to
further the government's interests in deterrence and in determining
the cause of an accident.' 62
Justice Marshall agreed withJustice Stevens' logic in his concur-
ring opinion that the regulations will not serve to deter employees
from using alcohol and drugs.' 63 Additionally, Justice Marshall
noted, the record contained no empirical evidence to support the
FRA's deterrence claim. 164 Thus, the dissent concluded that the
only remaining governmental interest to support suspicionless test-
ing-discerning the cause of an accident-is "a slender thread from
which to hang such an intrusive program."' 65
Justice Marshall closed his opinion by quoting Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes in his first dissenting opinion as a Member of the
Court: "'Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great
cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in
shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of im-
mediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and
distorts the judgement.' "166 Justice Marshall reiterated his accusa-
tion that the majority has succumbed to the popular interest of the
day, namely drug prohibition, while sacrificing the "time-honored
and textually-based principles of the Fourth Amendment."' 67 The
majority's decision, warned Justice Marshall, will "reduce the pri-
vacy all citizens may enjoy."' 68
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
The majority's opinion in Skinner constitutes an unprecedented
erosion of protection under the fourth amendment. The majority
has found for the first time that a suspicionless search of arguably
the most private aspect in a citizen's life, the body, is "reasonable"
and not violative of the fourth amendment. Justice Kennedy's
fourth amendment analysis used broad, ill-defined tests to conclude
161 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1431 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 1432 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
163 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra note 109 and accompanying text for a sum-
mary of the concurrence.
164 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
165 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 1433 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Northern Sec. Co. v. United States,
193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting.)).
167 Id. at 1433 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
168 Id. (Marshall,J., dissenting). )
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that neither a warrant, probable cause, nor individualized suspicion
are necessary for a reasonable search. Further harm to the fourth
amendment was caused by the majority's broad approval of the
sweeping and intrusive FRA regulations. This erosion of our fourth
amendment rights clears the way for further, inevitable extensions
of drug testing of United States citizens under the guise of the war
on drugs. 16 9
A. THE MAJORITY'S USE OF THE "SPECIAL NEEDS BALANCING TEST"
IS INAPPROPRIATE
Justice Marshall's primary criticism of the Court's opinion is the
majority's use of, what this Note terms, the "special needs balancing
test." 170 Justice Marshall urged that the proper analysis of the
fourth amendment should be based on the text of the fourth amend-
ment. 17' Instead, Justice Marshall asserted, the majority continued
a trend begun in TL.O. 172 of recognizing a "special needs" excep-
tion to the fourth amendment precedent that "probable cause" is a
prerequisite to a full-scale search.' 73 According to justice Kennedy's
opinion in Skinner, the "special needs balancing test" works as out-
lined below.
The majority argued in Skinner that the government has a
" 'special need' beyond the normal need for law enforcement" when
it comes to regulating the conduct of railroad employees-to ensure
safety. 174 According to the majority, when a "special need" exists,
the Court should apply a balancing test to determine if the warrant
and probable cause requirements of the fourth amendment are "im-
practicable" standards of reasonableness. 75 Therefore, the Skinner
majority applied the balancing test, weighing the government's in-
terest in ensuring safety on the railroads against the employee's in-
169 Even as the Court was handing down this decision, it was extending suspicionless
drug testing to Customs Service agents in National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von
Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989). Contrary to Skinner, in Von Raab there had been no evi-
dence of drug abuse in the Customs Service department. Id. at 1398 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
170 See supra notes 115-127 and accompanying text for a summary of Justice Mar-
shall's criticism of the "special needs balancing test."
171 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1423 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall wrote,
"Without the content which those provisions [warrant and probable cause] give to the
Fourth Amendment's overarching command that searches and seizures be 'reasonable,'
the Amendment lies virtually devoid of meaning, subject to whatever content shifting
judicial majorities, concerned about the problems of the day, choose to give to that
supple term." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
172 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
173 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1424 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 1414.
175 Id.
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terest in privacy, and found that neither a warrant, probable cause,
nor individualized suspicion were necessary requirements for a reason-
able search. 176 Hence, the FRA drug testing program was deemed a
reasonable search.' 77
This Note finds two flaws with the majority's analysis in addi-
tion to Justice Marshall's overriding complaint that the analysis ig-
nores the literal requirements of the fourth amendment. First, the
prerequisite that the Court find "special needs" before they can ap-
ply the balancing test is a gratuitous step in the majority's analysis:
1) the Court has given no guidance as to when "special needs be-
yond the normal need for law enforcement" will be found; and 2) it
appears from prior "special needs" cases that "special needs" are
actually just another way of stating the governmental interest side of
the balancing test. Second, once the majority applied the balancing
of interests test to determine that the warrant and probable cause
requirements are "impracticable" standards of reasonableness, the
opinion did not provide a substitute standard of reasonableness as
prior "special needs" cases would suggest.
1. The "Special Needs" Test Is a Subjective, Unnecessary
Step in the Court's Analysis
The Skinner majority cited five cases to support its finding that
the government had a "special need beyond the normal need for
law enforcement."1 78 The Court first articulated its "special needs"
prerequisite to applying the balancing test in Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion in T.L. 0. 179 Justice Blackmun wrote, "Only in
those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-
cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its
balancing of interests for that of the Framers."' 80 - In T.L.O., the
"special need" was the need for school officials to have flexibility in
maintaining order in the school. 81
According to Justice Marshall, since T.L.O. the Court has found
"special needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement" when
176 Id. at 1414, 1421.
177 Id. at 1422.
178 Id. at 1414. See supra note 57 and accompanying text for the majority's "special
needs" analysis.
179 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). In T.L.O., the Court held
that a school official's search of a student's purse was reasonable because he had reason-
able grounds for suspecting that the search would turn up evidence and because the
scope of the search was not excessively intrusive. Id. at 344-47.
180 Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
181 Id. at 353; see supra note 120.
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1) the government had an interest in ensuring the efficient and
proper operation of the workplace,18 2 and 2) the government had an
interest in ensuring that probation restrictions are observed.'8 3 In
its "special needs" analysis the majority cited to the above cases as
well as to two cases where "special needs" equaled the following: 1)
the need to supervise automobile junkyards as a regulated indus-
try,' 8 4 and 2) the need to preserve internal order and discipline in
prisons. 85
As Justice Marshall observed, "special needs" have now been
found in a "patchwork quilt of settings."' 86 Indeed, it is to the
above wide variety of searches that the Skinner majority, in one sen-
tence, analogizes the drug testing search by stating:
The Government's interest in regulating the conduct of railroad em-
ployees to ensure safety, like its supervision of probationers or regu-
lated industries, or its operation of a government office, school, or
prison, "likewise presents 'special needs' beyond normal law enforce-
ment that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-
cause requirements."187
The only apparent analogy between these "special needs" cases is
that in each case the Court's finding of a "special need beyond the
normal need for law enforcement" is synonomous with the Court's
finding of a substantial government interest in the search. 88 Ac-
182 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (search of a government employee's
office while he was on an administrative leave pending the outcome of an investigation
into charges of improprieties was a reasonable search).
183 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987) (warrantless search of a proba-
tioner's home based only on information provided by an informant that probationer
might have guns in his home was a reasonable search).
184 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987). The Burger opinion never made a
specific finding of "special needs." Instead, the Court found that since the government
interests outweigh the privacy interests a "special need" existed. The only mention of
"special needs" in this case was in the following senctence: "[W]e conclude that, as in
other situations of 'special need,' see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 353 (1985)
(opinion concurring in judgment), where the privacy interests of the owner are weak-
ened and the government interests in regulating particular businesses are concomitantly
heightened, a warrantless inspection of commercial premises may well be reasonable."
Id.
185 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 544-48 (1979). Again, the Court made no finding of
"special needs" per se. The Court found that body-cavity searches of prison inmates
after contact visits with persons outside the prison were constitutional as "[m]aintaining
institutional security and preserving internal order and discipline are essential goals that
may require limitation or retraction of the retained constitutional rights of both con-
victed prisoners and pretrial detainees." Id. at 546.
186 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1424 (1989) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
187 Id. at 1414 (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74).
188 See supra note 184 for an example of the Court directly equating "special needs"
with the government's interest in conducting the search.
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cordingly, if the government has a substantial interest in conducting
a search, then there exists a "special need beyond the normal need
for law enforcement." 89
Indeed, as Justice Marshall noted in his dissent, the past "spe-
cial needs" cases cited by the majority are clearly distinguishable
from Skinner because in those cases the government's search was
both aimed at a person's belongings and not at their body' 90 and
based on some degree of reasonable suspicion. 19' These distinc-
tions lead to the inference that the majority felt that the "special
need" in Skinner was an even stronger "special need" than in the
other cases and thus the majority was warranted in extending "spe-
cial needs" analysis to a suspicionless search of the human body.
However, the Skinner majority did not draw these distinctions. In-
stead, as Justice Marshall noted, "[W]ith nary a word of explanation
or acknowledgment of the novelty of its approach, the majority ex-
tends the 'special needs' framework to a regulation involving com-
pulsory blood withdrawal and urinary excretion, and chemical
testing of the bodily fluids collected through these procedures."' 192
Given the indeterminate criteria by which the Court determines
that "special needs" exist, and the resultant broad range of searches
where "special needs" have been found, Justice Blackmun's well-
intentioned rule that "special needs" must be found before applying
189 The reverse is also true: whenever a "special need" exists, the government has a
strong interest in conducting the search. Cf. National Treasury Employees' Union v.
Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989). In Von Raab, the majority found that "the Customs
Service's drug testing program is not designed to serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement"
because, in part, the test results may not be turned over to prosecutors-a point where
Skinner is clearly distinguishable. Id. at 1390 (emphasis added). The Von Raab majority
wrote, "These substantial interests [detering drug use in the Customs Service department],
no less than the Government's concern for safe rail transportation at issue in [Skinner], pres-
ent a special need that may justify departure from the ordinary warrant and probable
cause requirements." Id. at 1390-91 (emphasis added).
190 An exception is the visual inspection of prisoner's body-cavities in Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520 (1979). However, the second distinguishing feature-a reasonable suspi-
cion that a search will turn up evidence--does exist in Bell as the search in question takes
place after prisoners engage ii contact visits with a person from outside the institution.
Id. at 558.
191 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1425 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra note 125 for
examples of suspicion that gave rise to a search. Justice Marshall wrote:
Until today, it was conceivable that, when a Government search was aimed at a per-
son and not simply the person's possessions, balancing analysis had no place. ...
And until today, it was conceivable that a prerequisite for surviving "special needs"
analysis was the existence of individualized suspicion .... In widening the "special
needs" exception to probable cause to authorize searches of the human body un-
supported by any evidence of wrongdoing, the majority today completes the process
[of eliminating the probable cause requirement] begun in T.L.O.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
192 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1425 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the balancing test is an unnecessary, gratuitous step in the Court's
analysis. Rather than confusing the analysis with a forced finding
of "special needs," the Court may as well have proceeded directly to
the multifarious balancing of interests test. However, once the ma-
jority did proceed to the balancing test, they misapplied this test as
well.
2. The Balancing of Interests Test Should Have Provided
a Substitute Standard of Reasonableness
The Skinner majority applied the balancing test to determine
that the warrant, probable cause, and individualized suspicion stan-
dards of reasonableness are not necessary in order to have a reason-
able search under the fourth amendment. 193 The majority did not
replace these usual standards with another standard of reasonable-
ness. Rather, it seemed to argue that since, based on the balancing
of interests test, the lack of warrants, probable cause, and individu-
alized suspicion did not make the search unreasonable, then the
search must necessarily be reasonable. However, in prior cases of
"special needs balancing analysis," the Court used the balancing
test more as a threshold test to see if a warrant or probable cause is
necessary in order to have a reasonable search. Once the Court de-
termined that the warrant and probable cause requirements were
"impracticable," the balancing of interests analysis has been used to
help determine a new standard of reasonableness.
For example, the majority in TL.O. only used the balancing of
governmental interests versus privacy interests when they were de-
termining the "threshold" question of whether they could do away
with the warrant and probable cause requirement. 194 The majority
did not use the balancing test in that case to determine whether or
not a search was reasonable.' 9 5 Instead, the majority used a stan-
dard of reasonableness that considered whether the search was both
" 'justified at its inception' " and, as conducted " 'reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place.' "196 The Skinner majority disregarded this standard,
193 Id. at 1422.
194 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985).
195 Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion in T.L.O., used the balancing test to
help determine what the new standard of reasonableness should be. Justice Blackmun
wrote, "The special need for an immediate response to behavior that threatens either
the safety of schoolchildren and teachers or the educational process itself justifies the
Court in excepting school searches from the warrant and probable cause requirement,
and in applying a standard determined by balancing the relevant interests." T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
196 Id. at 341 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). In T.L.O., the Court
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which required some suspicion prior to testing. The RLEA had as-
serted that the TL.O. standard was the proper test to be used to
determine the reasonableness of the drug testing.'9 7
Likewise, in O'Connor, the Court used the balancing of the gov-
ernment's interests in the search versus the privacy interests of the
employee only when it held that the warrant and probable cause re-
quirements of the fourth amendment do not apply. 198 The Court
held that "public employer intrusions on the constitutionally pro-
tected privacy interests of government employees ...should be
judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circum-
stances."' 1 9 The Court then went on to enunciate the criteria found
in T.L.O. as the standard of reasonableness by which the search in
O'Connor was to be judged.200
Whether or not the T.L.O. criteria is the applicable test of rea-
sonableness in Skinner, these previous Supreme Court cases imply
that the balancing test is used to help determine a standard of rea-
sonableness (when warrant and probable cause are no longer the
standards), and not employed as the standard itself.20 1 Despite this
precedent, the Skinner majority has boiled the fourth amendment
analysis down to the following: a search is reasonable if the govern-
ment interests in the search outweigh the individual interests in the
found that the search was justified at its inception because the school official had reason-
able grounds for suspecting his search of the student's purse would turn up evidence.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 344-47. The T.L.O. Court also found that the scope of the search was
reasonably related to the reason for conducting the ,search because the search was not
excessively intrusive. Id.
197 Brief for the Respondents at 15-20, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989) (No. 87-1555).
198 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719-25 (1987).
199 Id. at 725-26.
200 Id. at 726. See supra note 196 and accompanying text for T.L.O. standard of
reasonableness.
201 In O'Connor v. Ortega, Justice Blackmun described his understanding of how the
balancing analysis should proceed:
Courts turn to the balancing test only when they conclude that the traditional war-
rant and probable-cause requirements are not a practical alternative. Through the
balancing test, they then try to identify a standard of reasonableness, other than the
traditional one, suitable for the circumstances. The warrant and probable-cause re-
quirements, however, continue to serve as a model in the formulation of the new
standard. It is conceivable, moreover, that a court, having initially decided that it is
faced with a situation of "special need" that calls for balancing, may conclude after
application of the balancing test that the traditional standard is a suitable one for
the context after all.
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 744 n.8 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Despite Justice Blackmun's above reasoning, one must consider whether a replace-
ment standard of reasonableness (as defined by a balancing of interests analysis) will be
any less manipulable than the balancing test itself. Just as the "special needs" finding is
an unneccessary step in the Court's analysis as explained supra, perhaps developing an-
other reasonableness standard would likewise be surplusage.
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right to be free from the search.20 2
B. THE SKIANER MAJORITY DID NOT GIVE THE PROPER WEIGHT TO
THE PRIVACY SIDE OF THE BALANCING TEST
The Skinner majority's opinion, which adopted the broad, ma-
nipulable "special needs balancing test," continued to be unnecces-
sarily broad as it unequivocally approved the highly intrusive FRA
drug testing program. 20 3 Although the most excessive aspect of the
whole drug testing program is testing without any degree of suspi-
cion, the Court could at least have conditioned its approval of the
FRA program upon a modification of the following three aspects of
the regulations which are particularly intrusive: 1) requiring both
blood and urine tests20 4 when blood tests suffice to show current
impairment; 2) allowing for direct observation of collection of the
urine sample;20 5 and 3) handing over positive test results to
prosecutors. 206
First, the FRA regulations are unnecessarily intrusive as they
require the taking of both blood and urine samples despite the
FRA's concession that only the blood tests measure current impair-
ment.20 7 The majority found that urine tests, which show off-duty
impairment, are still valuable because "this information [that em-
ployees used drugs during their off-duty hours] provide[s] the basis
for further investigative work designed to determine whether the
employee used drugs at the relevant times." 208 If the employee has
202 InJustice Brennan's partial concurrence and dissent in T.L.O. (with whom Justice
Marshall joined), he noted that the "government's side" of the balancing test is really a
misnomer because "[t]he government is charged with protecting the privacy and secur-
ity of the citizen, just as it is charged with apprehending those who violate the criminal
law." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 362 n.5 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Thus, the balance of interests should not be "between the
rights of the government and the rights of the citizen, but between opposing concep-
tions of the constitutionally legitimate means of carrying out the government's varied
responsibilities." Id.
203 AsJustice Marshall summarized, the majority erred in its application of the balanc-
ing test by "trivializing the raw intrusiveness of, and overlooking serious conceptual and
operational flaws in, the FRA's testing program." Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1423 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
204 49 C.F.R. § 219.203(a) (1988).
205 FIELD MANUAL, supra note 139, at D-2, D-5.
206 49 C.F.R. § 219.211(d) (1988). See supra note 35 for text of regulation.
207 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1431 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 49 C.F.R. § 219.309(b)(2)
(1988) (The statute requires railroads to issue a presumption of impairment notice
warning employees that urine tests may reveal the use of certain drugs within the recent
past and in rare cases up to 60 days before the sample is collected. "As a general matter,
the [urine] test cannot distinguish between recent use off the job and current
impairment.").
208 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1421.
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submitted both a blood and urine sample, as the regulations re-
quire, and the blood test is negative while the urine test is positive,
then that indicates that the employee was very likely not impaired
"at the relevant time." Yet the majority would allow an investiga-
tion into the employee's past activities. 20 9 Such an investigation
only serves to further the intrusive "big brother" aspect of the FRA
program. 210 Given that the blood tests are, arguably, less intrusive
than urine tests, 2 1' and given that they more closely achieve the rail-
roads' objective of deterring on-duty use of alcohol or drugs, the
majority could have conditioned its approval of the FRA drug test-
ing program on an elimination of urine testing without taking away
from the program's objectives.2 12
Second, not only are the mandatory urine tests a needless intru-
sion, but, as the dissent noted, the majority in all practicality allows
for the direct observation of urination.213 The majority found that
209 Id. The majority cited the FRA Field Manual which stated, "[T]he presence of
drugs in the urine may provide the basis for investigative leads that may establish drug
use contemporaneous with the accident." FIELD MANUAL, supra note 139 at B-4. Neither
the Court nor the FRA attempts to define how this investigation will take place or what
limits, if any, will be placed on the investigation.
210 One district court judge faced with a drug testing case wrote:
Drug testing is a form of surveillance, albeit a technological one. Nonetheless, it
reports on a person's off-duty activities just as surely as someone had been present
and watching. It is George Orwell's "Big Brother" Society come to life....
... We do not permit a search of every house on the block merely because
there is reason to believe that one contains evidence of criminal activity. No prohibi-
tion more significantly distinguishes our democracy from a totalitarian government
than that which bars warrantless searches and seizures.
Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (1986) (mass urine testing of
firefighters unconstitutional).
211 The majority found that blood tests are not a significant intrusion because such
"tests are commonplace in these days of periodic physical examinations and . . .the
quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and ... for most people the procedure involves
virtually no risk, trauma, or pain." Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1417 (citing Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)). The majority also found that urine tests "raise con-
cerns not implicated by blood or breath tests." Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1418.
212 Justice Marshall found that "[a]t the very least, the FRA could limit its use of
urinalysis to confirming findings of current impairment suggested by a person's blood
tests." This approach would still require employees to provide urine samples, but it
would disallow the possibility for abusive investigations as provided in the Field Manual.
Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1432 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
213 See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text. The regulations themselves pro-
vide that the FRA program is a "minimum Federal safety standard[] for [the] control of
alcohol and drugs use" and that the railroads are not restricted from enforcing addi-
tional or more stringent requirements not inconsistent with the program. 49 C.F.R.
§ 219.1(b) (1988). A railroad's requirement of direct observation is not inconsistent
with the FRA drug testing program. In the absence of strong dicta from the Court for-
bidding direct observation, there is nothing to suggest that the individual railroads will
not refrain from requiring direct observation.
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the regulations tried to be minimally intrusive by not requiring di-
rect observation. 214 Yet, in the same sentence the majority en-
dorsed the "desirability" of direct observation.21 5 This "wish" of
the majority that direct observation be used to insure the integrity
of the urine sample is particularly unnecessary given their familiarity
in Von Raab with alternative methods of monitoring the urine sam-
ple.2 16 The Court's approval of direct observation of collection of
urine samples is even more egregious when one considers the un-
likely possibility both that employees are carrying substitute samples
of urine with them on the unpredictable day of an accident/incident
and that employees would be able to produce and substitute the
false sample, especially given that the employee may just have ex-
perienced the trauma of a major train accident. Thus, the Court's
encouragement of direct observation results in an increase of costs
on the privacy side of the balancing test, which the Court ignores.
Lastly, the dissent found that the most striking example of the
excessiveness and intrusiveness of the FRA regulations was the al-
lowance for positive test results to be turned over to criminal prose-
cutors. 217 The majority accepted the FRA's explanation that this
section of the regulations is primarily for the agency's purposes-
214 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1418.
215 Id.
216 The Court summarizes the urine collection procedures in Von Raab as follows:
On reporting for the test, the employee must produce photographic identification
and remove any outer garments, such as a coat or ajacket, and personal belongings.
The employee may produce the sample behind a partition, or in the privacy of a
bathroom stall if he so chooses. To ensure against adulteration of the specimen, or
substitution of a sample from another person, a monitor of the same sex as the
employee remains close at hand to listen for the normal sounds of urination. Dye is
added to the toilet water to prevent the employee from using the water to adulterate
the sample.
National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1388 (1989).
The procedures in Von Raab also provided another example of reducing the intru-
siveness of the drug testing program. In Von Raab, the parties stipulated that the Cus-
toms Service's drug testing program would conform to recently enacted legislation that
governs certain federal employee drug testing programs. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1388
n. 1. The new law required the Secretary of Health and Human Services to promulgate
regulations to govern federal drug testing programs. Supplemental Appropriations Act
of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-71, § 503, 101 Stat. 391, 468-71. The final regulations require
employees to fill out a medical disclosure form only if the employee is notified that his or
her sample tested positive. 53 Fed. Reg. 11,979, 11,985-86 (1988). Although the Skin-
ner majority is aware of this simple reduction in the intrusiveness of the drug testing
procedures, the majority simply discounted (without taking notice of Von Raab or the
new regulations) the intrusiveness of the FRA requirement that employees disclose what
medications they have taken during the 30 days preceding testing. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at
1418 n.7. See supra note 81 for the Skinner majority's reasoning.
217 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1431 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra note 35 for text of
the relevant regulation.
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for example, to reanalyze a sample. 218 The majority found that the
section is not a " 'pretext' to enable law enforcement authorities to
gather evidence of penal law violations."2 1 9 The majority preferred
to address the question of the constitutionality of the provision that
the positive test samples may be turned over to prosecutors only
after there has been a "routine use in criminal prosecutions of evi-
dence obtained pursuant to [this regulation]. " 220 Unfortunately,
the majority's desire to wait for a persuasive showing that the blood,
breath and urine samples have been used in criminal proceedings
leaves open the "possibility of criminal prosecutions based on suspi-
cionless searches of the human body." 221 As the RLEA points out,
the decision allowing suspicionless blood and urine testing of rail-
road workers gives criminals greater protection under the fourth
amendment than that provided to law abiding citizens. 222
Justice Marshall wrote that "if the prospects of prosecutions
would lead the majority to reassess the validity of the testing pro-
gram with prosecutions as part of the balance," then the majority
should say so. Justice Marshall contended that the majority in the
alternative, should "condition its approval of that program on the
nonrelease of test results to prosecutors. " 223 Allowing this highly
intrusive aspect of the regulations to stand unchanged once again
demonstrates the majority's willingness to approve drug testing no
matter what the cost is to an individual's constitutional protec-
tions.224 Given the above examples of excessiveness of the FRA's
testing program, it is hard to fathom how Justice Kennedy could
suggest that "[bly and large, intrusions on privacy under the FRA
regulations are limited. ' 225 It is clear that the majority failed to give
the proper weight to the employees' privacy side of the balancing
218 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1415 n.5.
219 Id. (citing New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716-17 n.27 (1987)).
220 Id.
221 Id. at 1431 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
222 Brief for the Respondents at 35, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109
S. Ct. 1402 (1989) (No. 87-1555).
223 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1431 (Marshall, J, dissenting).
224 The regulations in Von Raab prohibit the use of test results in criminal prosecu-
tions. National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von'Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1390 (1989).
However, Von Raab is distinguishable from the current case because in Skinner a positive
test result could mean that an employee was operating a train while under the influence
of alcohol or drugs, which is analogous to drunk driving. In contrast, in Von Raab the
determination of whether the customs agent was under the influence of drugs while on-
duty is not as crucial of a question. Thus, in Von Raab the chance of someone pressing
charges against a customs agent is very slight, while in Skinner the chance of liability is
much higher.
225 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1417.
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test as the FRA regulations are extremely and unnecessarily
intrusive.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Skinner decision adopted a fourth amendment analysis that
is, in the words of the dissent, "unprincipled and dangerous." 226
The analysis is unprincipled because the majority ignored precedent
as well as the literal requirements of the fourth amendment and in-
stead based its decision on the manipulable "special needs balanc-
ing test." The Court's analysis is dangerous because it allowed the
majority to justify its position that suspicionless searches of the
human body are constitutional just as easily as it allowed the dissent
to justify its position that the searches are unconstitutional.
The Skinner majority used the "special needs balancing test,"
not only to hold that the warrant and probable cause requirements
of the fourth amendment are "impracticable," but also, for the first
time, to hold that no suspicion at all is needed in order to have a
reasonable search. In addition, the majority used the balancing of
interests test to proceed directly to the conclusion that the drug
testing search in Skinner is reasonable. This unprecedented holding
fulfilled Justice Marshall's prophecy, found in his first dissent
against the use of the "special needs balancing test," that use of the
balancing test portends " 'a dangerous weakening of the purpose of
the Fourth Amendment to protect the privacy and security of our
citizens.' "227
Thus, the Court's holding that mass suspicionless drug testing
of railroad employees is a reasonable search combined with its
unquestioning acceptance of the FRA regulations sets a dangerous
precedent. The holding in Skinner clears the way for extensions of
suspicionless drug testing programs to all segments of society228 as
well as extensions of the intrusiveness of drug testing programs
themselves. 229 The majority's eagerness to approve the drug testing
program in Skinner sets an ill-conceived precedent for the many drug
226 Id. at 1426 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
227 Id. at 1425 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
357-58 (1985)).
228 Conceivably, suspicionless drug testing will be allowed in any area where the gov-
ernment can find a "special need beyond the normal need for law enforcement." See
supra notes 170-192 and accompanying text for an analysis of when "special needs" may
be found.
229 Indeed, even as Skinner was being considered by the Courts, the FRA promulgated
and passed new regulations which allow for random drug testing of railroad employees.
49 C.F.R. §§ 219.601-.609 (list of CFR sections affected from October 3 through No-
vember 30, 1988) (adding Subpart G-Random Drug Testing Program).
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testing cases that are already in the courts and the many cases that
are likely to be brought into the courts.2 30 As Justice Marshall
predicted:
The immediate victims of the majority's constitutional timorousness
will be those railroad workers whose bodily fluids the Government
may now forcibly collect and analyze. But ultimately, today's decision
will reduce the privacy all citizens may enjoy, for, as Justice Holmes
understood, principles of law, once bent, do not snap back easily.2 3 1
Unfortunately, it appears as though Justice Marshall's prediction
will once again be fulfilled.
HEIDI P. MALLORY
230 Executive Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. at 32,889 (1986), requires the heads of
all federal agencies to promulgate drug testing programs. The agency heads must test
employees who hold "sensitive" positions. Id. at 32,890. The Executive Order's defini-
tion of "sensitive" is broad and it includes a very substantial portion of the federal work
force, including professional and non-professional staff and secretarial and clerical posi-
tions. Id. at 32,892-93.
231 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1433 (1989) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
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